THOUGH the cold war ended more than a decade ago, Russia鈥檚 frosty reaction to a US plan for a missile-defence shield in Europe shows that mistrust has not entirely melted away. The US wants to deploy anti-missile systems in Poland and the Czech Republic, with the declared aim of blocking attacks aimed at Europe or the US from the Middle East, particularly Iran.
Russia, however, is convinced that the plan is really there to block its own missiles, rendering them useless against the west. Relations have deteriorated fast, and since the US made its intentions public in January, Russia has tested a multiple-warhead missile capable of blasting through American defences. It also suspended its involvement in the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty, set up after the cold war ended to limit the numbers of troops and weapons in the region. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has dismissed Russia鈥檚 concerns as 鈥渓udicrous鈥�, and two rounds of talks have failed to bring the countries any closer to agreement.
The stand-off is a reminder of how threatening a new military technology can be. Like dreadnought battleships in the first world war, and nuclear weapons following the second world war, missile defence threatens to transform the military landscape, as it would allow countries to neutralise the effects of each other鈥檚 forces.
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What seems to have been ignored in the political exchanges is that there is no convincing evidence that missile defence works. The idea is for the defender to use radar to track and locate incoming missiles, then launch their own missiles to blow them up. This is incredibly hard to do. The technology faced its first major test in the 1991 Gulf war, when the US fired 47 short-range Patriot missiles at Iraqi Scud missiles. Despite initial claims that as many as 45 Scuds were struck down, video analysis suggested that as few as four were intercepted, and that even these were only knocked off-course.
Long-range interceptors such as those planned for eastern Europe face a much tougher task. Intercontinental ballistic missiles travel up to 10,000 kilometres 鈥� eclipsing the speed and range of a Scud. A feasibility study conducted in 2000 by Theodore Postol of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology concluded that missile defence is unlikely to be successful in the foreseeable future. In he added: 鈥淭he defense being developed won鈥檛 work 鈥� and few in Washington seem to know or care.鈥�
The situation does not appear to have changed. The US Missile Defense Agency claims a success rate of less than 56 per cent for long-range tests, and even that is for highly controlled situations. Few tests simulate anything like a real attack, which is likely to entail a larger number of missiles, and countermeasures such as dummy warheads.
So why is the US apparently willing to cause such tensions for the sake of an unproven technology? Perhaps officials hope the mere idea of a shield will deter enemy attacks, whether it works or not. Or they may be setting up the systems now in the expectation that they can be upgraded later. This is a dangerous bluff. Threatening to neutralise others鈥� forces is likely to be seen as an aggressive move (as the Russian reaction shows) and risks eliciting an aggressive response.
鈥淲hy is the US apparently willing to raise tensions for the sake of an unproven technology?鈥�
The missile defence industry continues to insist that the technology works. It argues that the system鈥檚 odds of success are increased by having several layers that target missiles at different stages of flight, including 鈥渂oost-phase鈥� missile defence, which kicks in just after launch. Whether this optimism is justified is hard to tell, as even the most basic feasibility data concerning missile defence is kept classified by the US. On the basis of information that was publicly available, a 2004 concluded that none of the concepts being developed in the US was 鈥渓ikely to be viable for the foreseeable future鈥� against certain types of missiles.
Next month, ministers from the US and Russia will meet in Moscow to discuss how to proceed. Let鈥檚 hope that both sides are honest about the capabilities of the weapons systems they are planning. Uncertainty and miscalculation pose a danger to us all.
